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Psychological assessments of young people in family
courts: relationality, experience, representation and the
principle of “do no harm”
Tom Billington
Introduction
Young people globally are the subjects of intensive regimes of government,
whether via the direct authority of state legislatures or, in some countries,
through sophisticated power dispersal and exchange mechanisms operatio-
nalized by “whole arm[ies] of technicians… warders, doctors, chaplains,
psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists…” (Foucault 1977, p. 11). For
decades, I have been one of those technicians, working with young people
from infancy to young adulthood, as researcher, practitioner, trainer, and
supervisor invariably enmeshed in developmental discourses whatever the
setting (schools, homes, university, and family courts), which have circulated
ultimately around the nature and boundaries of childhood and the differ-
ences among young people (Burman 2017).
It has been the responsibilities, ethics, and consequences of professional
practice that have been of particular concern, however, especially when
working under the auspices of the state. Countless dilemmas have arisen
relating to the processes of individual and collective action in situations
which will no doubt be familiar to all practitioners and researchers who
work with young people under statutory conditions. In previous critiques of
professional practice, a variety of qualitative research methodologies have
been deployed, for example, discourse analysis (Billington 1995),
Foucauldian analyses of power (1996), critical psychology (1997, 2017),
narrative methods (2000), psychodynamics (2006), often relating to direct
work with young people (2006a), their parents (Billington, McNally and
McNally, 2000) or their teachers (2012).
In reflecting for the first time upon work in family courts, this article
examines ways in which assessments with young people might be concep-
tualized and performed in a governmental arena to accord specifically with
the principle of “do no harm,” using narrative methodology in the form of a
fictional case vignette. There can be no massaging away of the power invested
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in psychologists or in the legal contexts of performance, although the focus in
this article will not be directly on analyses of power relations but rather
purposefully on other epistemological and ontological resources (Corcoran
2012) which aspire to that primary principle of “do no harm.”
The Family Division of the High Courts of England and Wales can request
psychologists to assist in its decision making in respect of the care of young
people, for example, in situations in which young people have either suffered
or are considered at risk of suffering serious harm or abuse. The work of both
family courts and the psychological assessments conducted under their
jurisdiction are complex. But not only can professional practice generally
be inaccessible to research (Adams & Miller 2008; Fleet et al. 2016), but
family court proceedings also can be especially opaque, with only a few
authorized exceptions (Motzkau 2007; Jay et al. 2017; Trinder 2013;
Broadhurst et al. 2015). The reporting restrictions essential in protecting
the anonymity of those young people who are the focal point for the work
of family courts (Channel 4 2013; Guardian 2015; Telegraph 2015), while
absolutely necessary, can thwart attempts to shed light on a largely hidden
public governance of the (young) person.
Psychologists are instructed to work in the “best interests of the child”
(Unicef 1989; Department of Health 1989), but the issue of psychological
assessments in family courts has on occasion been controversial. Following
alarmist media reports (Channel 4 2012; Guardian 2016, 2016a), the Family
Justice Council (FJC) and British Psychological Society (BPS) subsequently
updated guidance for how the chosen “experts” should act in accordance
with their responsibilities as practising psychologists (2016). The FJC/BPS
guidance placed as central within any assessment process “psychological
formulation [which is] a highly skilled process combining scientific princi-
ples with reflective practices…” (para. 2.4, p. 4). In developing understand-
ings and possibilities offered in this concept of “reflective practices,” three
ontological resources are drawn upon in this article—relationality, experience,
and representation—which can struggle to achieve primacy in some assess-
ment and training models and the process will look to instantiate Harre’s
claim for “qualitative psychology as science” (2004, p. 1).
The article is a response to personal dilemmas experienced in professional
practice, to issues arising as a supervisor/educator but also to those wider
public concerns expressed via the media and state institutions. It is important
to emphasize that it is an essentially theoretical study that looks neither to
critique the work of family courts nor to provide a systematic evaluation of
the work of psychologists, whether in family courts or elsewhere. Rather, the
article is principally rooted in critiques of psychological practice which
address that principle of “do no harm” by focusing on the “encounter”
(relationality) between psychologist and young person (Billings & Stoeckle
1998; May 2007) but also on the quest for ethical, theoretical, and empirical
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research methods which might represent something of the phenomena aris-
ing during those encounters. Being mindful of Michael Billig’s rejoinder that
there can be no psychology without people (2011), the article’s empirical
claims are located within myself as writer and in the construction of a
fictional case vignette (Clough 2011; Kara 2013; Orbach 2016). The fictional
vignette is preferred as a means of facilitating the arguments not only on
account of legal complexities but also due to ethical concerns involved when
returning to interrupt the lives of young people and their families seen
previously within the family court whose circumstances in the past (invari-
ably distressing) may well be difficult for them to revisit.
Following a critique of the claims to science made within psychological
practice, the interface is explored between the principle of “do no harm” and
the circulation of psychopathologies. A section on the problematics of repre-
sentation is then followed by presentation and analysis of the fictional case
vignette. The article constitutes an original conceptual contribution to a
highly complex area of work—the psychological assessments of young people
in family courts—in which there is little previous research and, subsequently,
provides directions for future research, training, and professional practice.
The problematics of scientific evidence in psychological practice
“Bitzer,” said Thomas Gradgrind. “Your definition of a horse.”
“Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-
teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds
hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in
mouth.” Thus (and much more) Bitzer. (Dickens 1995 [1854], pp. 10–1)
In this extract from the English Victorian novel Hard Times, the school
benefactor, Thomas Gradgrind, urges a star protégé, Bitzer, to provide the
class with the “facts” about horses. Bitzer’s response was in stark contrast to
the efforts of Sissy Jupe, a new girl in the school who, moments before
Bitzer’s authoritative enunciation, had been paralysed by this same question.
Sissy and her father (a “horse breaker…veterinary surgeon…”; Dickens,
p. 10), however, were familiar with animals and horses, and her inability to
respond was due not to any lack of knowledge but in part to her failure to
comprehend both the strictures and the implications of the specific question
itself. For Gradgrind’s question just did not make sense in relation to her
experience of the individual animals with whom she lived and breathed.
In the brief extract, Dickens allows us to see that there are certain kinds of
knowledge ill-suited to represent the living. This can be a problem for all
psychologists when using forms of representation which are unable to con-
template persons (Martin, Sugarman & Hickinbottom 2010; Costa & Shimp
2011), a problem rendered visible whenever the person is denied in favour of
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the category. Luria’s solution to the persistent methodological dilemma in the
past can be seen in his call for psychology to become a “romantic science”
(1977; also see Pearce 2010). In medicine, Oliver Sacks implored his students,
“don’t try to remember syringomyelia from your text books—think of me”
(2016, p. 181), adding, “I felt that a student could not be reduced to a number
or a test any more than a patient could” (p. 181). Lee and Motzkau (2011,
p. 7) suggest that the social and the biological provide altogether “ontologi-
cally separate spheres of activity.” Psychologists in family courts are routinely
reminded in “instructions” (the legal contract) that assessments provide only
opinion; the “facts” of any matter will be determined by the court itself
following consideration of the whole of the evidence. Despite this helpful
directive, the task for the psychologist, that of representing individual living
persons, is problematic, especially when contributing to processes in which
life-affecting decisions are being made about those same young people.
The “scientist-practitioner” model (Committee on training in clinical
psychology 1947; Shapiro 1967; Soldz & McCullough 2000) became estab-
lished in most professional psychology training programmes in the United
States and the United Kingdom during the second half of the 20th century,
and a very particular kind of knowledge base developed upon which clinical
practices should be constructed. The theoretical assumptions underpinning
many such training models have thereafter been developed into epistemolo-
gies which, if applied exclusively, can imply that psychological knowledge
exists in inert forms distinct from actual persons, can only reliably be
obtained under experimental conditions (i.e., specifically randomised control
trials), and is knowable only to the expert psychologist. Such an approach can
disavow the individual client (young person) in much the same way that
Gradgrind had claimed a knowledge of all horses superior to that possessed
by the young horse-woman. The knowledge or facts circulated by psycholo-
gists can conceal epistemological and ontological complexities within forms
of authoritative, intrinsically paternalistic discourse (Gilligan 1982;
Henriques et al. 1984; Butler 1990; Burman 2017), which had bewildered
Sissy yet which had been recognized by one of the founding figures of
modern psychology:
Probably a crab would be filled with a sense of personal outrage if it could hear us
class it without ado or apology as a crustacean, and thus dispose of it. “I am no
such thing,” it would say; “I am MYSELF, MYSELF alone.” (James 1987
[1902], p. 17)
Sissy Jupe will have had relationships not just with any generalised quad-
ruped but also with many individual living animals and horses which,
while possessing many observable differences, could no doubt also exhibit
a more subtle range of character traits, behaviours, and inclinations. It is
argued here, therefore, that psychological assessments for family courts
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need to be able to engage with methods capable of moving beyond the
level of the category, the generalizable or the quantifiable. The “reflective
practices” suggested by the FJC/BPS (see originally Schon 1983) invite
potentially different conceptualizations of the person to emerge beyond
those available within a narrow application of positivist principles, espe-
cially if extended to the more ontologically nuanced possibilities of reflex-
ivity (Finlay & Gough 2003). Reflective practice also encourages the
psychologist to draw on data from the relational encounters in the dyad
between the assessor and the assessed, to consider the potential impact of
those events on formulation, and to draw on the psychologist’s own
experience. Perhaps there needs to be a Copernican revolution so we can
begin to understand more scientifically the relational and experiential
possibilities in the psychologist-client dyad, although any “science of
relationships” (Bion 1970, p. 4) applied in practice would always be subject
to the problematics of representation in the formulation of subsequent
professional opinion.
Performing pathologization: minimizing harm
Most young people assessed in family courts have been deemed via their life
experiences to be in some way at risk of serious harm. Legislation and
subsequent guidance to psychologists (BPS 2015) continue to support genu-
ine attempts by practitioners to restrict the distress experienced by young
people who have been subjected to often horrendous situations commonly
distilled into the term “abuse” which, by definition, concerns serious harm
suffered by the person. This article does not seek specifically to address the
various forms of harm and abuse suffered by young people (Buckley,
Horwath & Whelan 2006; Holt, Buckley & Whelan 2008; Warner 2014).
While there are many social situations in which young people need protect-
ing, what if the assessment practices themselves constitute a potential source
of harm?
In many countries, the psychologist’s expertise and the conduct of the
assessment itself are subject to the authority of professional and/or other
statutory bodies, responsibilities which in the United Kingdom are exercised
by the BPS and the Health Care Professions Council (HCPC). While specific
techniques and methodologies appropriate in given situations are rarely
made explicit either by the professional bodies or by the employer (here, a
family court), the “instructions” received by psychologists prior to any
assessment within family courts often spell out the “problem” (the likelihood
that the young person has suffered some form of harm or abuse) and in the
process create the epistemological terrain, deploying specific concepts that
are inherently psychological. “Attachment,” “behaviour,” “cognition,” “dis-
ability,” and “learning difficulties” are just a few, but in recent years,
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY 5
“attention deficit,” “autism,” and “emotional well-being and mental health”
are all common terms upon which the psychologist is expected to have
expertise. In this article, while taking care not to deny people’s experiences
of themselves, such categories are regarded only rarely as the inevitable
consequence of a simple biological determinism. Rather, more often they
are viewed as social accounts or “narratives” circulated by psychologists (and
others) which require sensitive application and interpretation. In my experi-
ence, the potential for harm arises should any representations within assess-
ments serve to construct the young person primarily in terms of a priori
deficits or pathologies at the expense of other qualities or potentialities.
The principle of “do no harm” is commonly but erroneously attributed to
Hippocrates (Sokol 2013), although the requirement for the medical practi-
tioner to avoid harming the patient is long established (Inman 1860). While
this principle is accepted within the various ethical protocols for psycholo-
gists, both in research and practice (BPS 2015), it had been apparent during
my own professional training years ago that a focus on quantification and
psychopathology was not balanced by an equally sophisticated consideration
of those issues of relationality, experience, and representation, which seemed
ill-served by the “epistemological preoccupations” (Goodley 2017, pers.
comm., 10 October) of much mainstream psychological science. The con-
sequences of restricting epistemological or ontological possibilities in prac-
tice, observed first in educational and then in legal spaces, has resulted in
assumptions not only that the psychologist is an essentially expert “unitary
rational subject” (Hollway 1989, pp. 28–9) but also that young persons are
passive in their manifestation of any category. The shorthand of the pathol-
ogy can be enticing to hard-pressed services and supportive practitioners yet
is ultimately misleading if it results in practices that fail to take account of the
individual young person operating within unique constellations or variables
of time and space (Bergson 2001 [1913]).
During family court assessments, experiential data arising during the
“clinical encounter” (Katz & Alegria 2009) can be overlooked by the
psychologist if his or her focus remain primarily on a search for catego-
rical certainties in respect of the young person. Reflection upon assessment
encounters, however, can just as easily be consigned to dispassionate
theoretical critique, and it is the intrinsic experiential relationality of
psychologist and client which might more usefully be considered to be at
the core of the assessment. A bold reconsideration of the penumbra of
data that arise during such encounters demands not only a reflection upon
practice (and research into practice) but also attention to forms of analysis
and representation demanded by the empirical data—from shared atten-
tions and communications to the socio-economic and cultural context in
which the assessment is conducted and all the subtle and even more
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obvious forms in which we perform the “how” of human being in relation
to others.
Mainstream psychology rejected Freudian attempts to investigate an
individual’s inner experience (following the Clark Lectures; Harris 2010;
Billington 2017), some psychologists having done so on scientific
grounds, others resisting on account of ethical concerns, aware of the
potential dangers posed by government (Parker 2005). It is important to
remember, however, the scientific error made whenever we ignore James’s
dictum:
Psychology is the science of mental life, both of its phenomena and of their
conditions…the faculty [mind] does not exist absolutely, but works under condi-
tions; and the quest of the conditions becomes the psychologist’s most interesting
task. (James 2010, 1 & 2 [1890])
It could be possible to perform psychological assessments in ways which
ignore both those inner experiences, which were the subject of Freud’s
speculations (now being explored again by contemporary neuroscience),
and the conditions for our human being and experience contemplated by
James. In the process of assessment, it can be tempting for the psychologist to
rely exclusively on positivist principles of testing, quantification, and general-
izability, although such methods invariably disappoint in their search for
accurate evocations of individual persons existing “absolutely.”
The plurality of psychological science envisaged by James (2010 [1890])
had been overwhelmed at the beginning of the 20th century by the desire of
psychologists who, having been tantalised by the prospect of isolating indi-
viduals as the subject of inquiry, were to become increasingly frustrated by
the impenetrability of that same human subject. Epistemologies and forms of
reductionist representation inculcated during practitioner training have
tended to be underpinned by statistically saturated models of persons
which construct, not scientific absolutes but numerically infused representa-
tions of nonpersons placed only in relation to representations of other
nonpersons. The associated processes of classification then produce diagnos-
tically inclined approximations, chimera when attempts are made to map
them simplistically onto the lives and experiences of individual persons (for
detailed critiques see, e.g., Fanon 1952; Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1975; Latour
1979; Gilligan 1982; Hollway 1989; Danziger 1990; Parker 1992; Burman
2017; Hacking 2002; Sugarman 2009; Packer 2011). In my experience, pro-
fessionals associated with family courts, whether from a legal, health, social
care, or psychological background, are highly committed to protecting young
people from damaging situations. In many cases, however, a young person’s
manner of presentation comes to the attention of services in forms that too
often remain stuck in that diagnostic attitude (Department of Health 2015).
While courts can accept the transient nature of the various categories, any
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temporary diagnostic clarity achieved, however illusory (Hacking 1985), can
become a touchstone upon which courts can build their decision making
with greater confidence to protect the young person from circumstances
which might more usefully or accurately be described as distressing or even
terrifying.
What diagnostic accounts risk, of course, is to distribute representations
which, in creating “kinds of persons” (Hacking 2007), fail to accommodate
the actual living person. At worst, diagnostics situate the young person
within narratives in which he or she actually comes to create the diagnosis
of which is spoken, immersed in narrative constructions that are embedded
in processes of “classificatory looping” (Hacking 1995). That is, a prevailing
diagnostic account of the person risks that the young person will begin to
believe such (deficit) accounts of their personhood and perhaps subtly
imbibe, accentuate, or assume the characteristics of the attributed diagnosis.
Diagnostic accounts are underdeveloped theoretically and empirically in
relation to issues of representation and are frequently inadequate to account
for the complex conditions or contexts in which the individual person is
situated. That categories and diagnoses can at times provide useful narratives
is not challenged, and there will be occasions in practice when their applica-
tion will be helpful; however, diagnostic accounts can be worryingly incom-
plete within psychological assessment processes.
Further, a primary focus on diagnosis can too easily serve to restrict any
potentiality of an individual young person through an overwhelming deploy-
ment of representations which are synonymous with disabling discourses of
deficit (Goodley 2014; Goodley & Runswick-Cole 2012). The dangers of such
a limited epistemological palette for any science of the person are again being
recognized in neuroscience (Damasio 1994; Choudhury & Slaby 2012), while
social constructionists remind us that as psychologists we do not merely
respond to something already in existence but rather through our engage-
ment choose either to reify old constructs or to create new “kinds” (narra-
tives) of person (Burr 2003). This again is not to deny individuals’
experiences of themselves but to also assert that while psychological diagnoses
are not mere fictions…they are narratives which provide incomplete and
potentially misleading accounts of the person.
Researching practice: the search for method
While much professional training in psychology is based ultimately on
assumptions about the primacy of quantitative and positivist epistemologies,
the case study has become established as an important resource in teaching
and training (Petersen 1990; Mayo 2004). Despite the long association of case
study methodology with psychoanalytic research, professional bodies remain
active users of case study methodology, for example, when articulating policy
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implications and providing advice to the public (General Medical Council
2013; BPS 2017). In training programmes, trainees can be presented with case
studies of individuals to encourage the development of reflective and poten-
tially reflexive practices (Billington 2000), while qualitative researchers too
have long recognized the value of the case study, whether anonymised,
fictionalized, or simulated (Ziv et al. 2003; Mills, Durepros and Wiebe, eds.
2010; Kara 2013; Cole 2013). Complex issues relating to representation can
potentially remain unacknowledged in practice settings, however, with words
frequently left to speak for themselves. What case study methodologies
invariably hold in common, whether for research or training purposes, is
that their representations take overtly narrative forms.
Narrative methods are not in themselves a guarantor of ethical practice,
which will necessarily avoid the risk of harm to young people since it is
through narrative that pathologies are circulated and analyses of power and
politicized discourse can be concealed. The study and application of narrative
methodologies, however, has been increasingly potent within social science
research during the last 30 years (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 1993;
Clandinin & Connelly 2000; Crossley 2000). Its importance extends across
and beyond the social sciences, for example, from sociology (Richardson
1990) to philosophy (Kearney 2002), even energy science (Moezzi, Janda &
Rotmann 2017) and is considered by some to constitute perhaps the defining
characteristic of human being: “The chief characteristic of the specifically
human life…is that it is always full of events which ultimately can be told as a
story…” (Arendt 1958, p. 72).
While the problematics of language and representation have been the
focus of a politically informed critical psychology (Foucault 1970; Parker
1992; Walkerdine 2002) as well as by a developmental psychology informed
by feminist critique and deconstruction (Burman 1997, 2017; Wetherell &
Edley 1999; Bird 1999), Jerome Bruner was one of the first psychologists to
realise the importance of a narrative psychology that focusses not only on
issues of power and representation but also on the pervasive story-telling
function in daily lives:
Insofar as we account for our own actions and for the human events that occur
around us principally in terms of narrative, story, drama, it is conceivable that our
sensitivity to narrative provides the major link between our sense of self and our
sense of others in the social world around us. (Bruner 1990, p. 94)
The suggestion here is that, at a fundamental level, people make sense of
their lives by “narrativising their experiences, telling stories both to them-
selves and others, not just through their words but through their actions too”
(Billington 2000, p. 37), a function from which our professional identity and
authority as psychologists offer no respite. The work of the psychologist,
from the reading of the court papers, to the performance of the assessment
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and through to the eventual report-writing itself, constitutes a flow of
narrative making.
The stories we tell as psychologists are not just about the young person,
parent, or carer, however, since the psychologist too is actively involved and
so we lose sight of our own story at our peril. I argue, therefore, that to be
more confidently “reflective” (FJC/BPS 2016), the exchanges or encounters
between psychologist and young person should be seen as part of that story-
telling, a dynamic process producing data that enable the psychologist to
reflect on the scientific and ethical issues at stake within assessments. A focus
on the encounter enables reflections upon the kinds of narratives which
might be more likely to avoid harm and support even potentially transfor-
mative accounts for the young person. The following five “how” (as opposed
to “what”) questions are proposed, first, as criteria for developing assessment
narratives with young people in which we seek to reflect on the scientific
formulations we construct and, second, as criteria for research and analysis
into those professional practices (again, as narratives):
● How do we speak of young people?
● How do we speak with young people?
● How do we write of young people?
● How do we listen young people?
● How do listen to ourselves when [when working with young people]
(derived from Billington 2006, p. 8)?
Each question can be deployed to provide a template for research into
professional practices, provide a means of managing the data/narratives
generated in the encounter or wider family proceedings, and support poten-
tially transformational representations. The questions enable the psychologist
to attune to aspects of the person which lie beyond any category, diagnosis,
or deficit narrative in demanding a more active reflection upon experiential
responses to the individual client/young person and even open a space in
which that person might wish to contribute.
In constructing narratives about young people that can attend to those
issues of relationality, experience, and representation, it can be easy to per-
form solely in a manner which accords with what Bruner refers to as
“narrative diachronicity” (1991, p. 6) (see also de Saussure 1983 [1916];
Giacalone Ramat, Mauri & Molinelli 2013). Such forms tend only to focus
on the sequential aspects of narrative (along the diachronic axis), which risks
obscuring the phenomena of experience occurring inside the synchronic or
vertical linguistic axis. While narratives provide a means of representing the
sequence or chain of events along the temporal, diachronic axis there is a risk
that a preoccupation with the merely chronological obscures the experiential
phenomena living within the moment of synchrony (which Lacan referred to
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as the “metaphoric axis”; Lacan 1977; Billington 1995). It is in this way that
any narrative does not merely possess a beginning, middle, and end point
(i.e., along a linear plane), for there are phenomena occurring inside
moments of time which can be of particular significance or in some way
replete with meanings or profound experience.
Whether using concepts and narratives associated with the diachronic
(metonymic) or synchronic (metaphoric) axes, employing psychoanalytic
concepts of displacement and condensation (Frosh 1987), or even consider-
ing assemblages and rhizomes (Deleuze & Guattari 1987), there is a shared
recognition of a dilemma posed by models of a Cartesian scientific rational-
ism; that is, how to make sense of the moment. Interpretive phenomenolo-
gical analysis (IPA; Smith, Flowers & Larkin 2009) constitutes a further
potential response to this dilemma while the “temporary affective unsettled-
ness” experienced by practitioners in “liminal hotspots” (Motzkau & Clinch
2017, p. 270) is a more recent attempt to articulate moments of potential
“suspension” or transition.
The fictional vignette below models the five “how” questions above by
constructing various fictionalized pasts to demonstrate ways in which psy-
chologists can demonstrably reflect on their ontological choices based on
experience of the encounter. Eventually, the analysis in section 5 (of “Mo”)
settles on a narrative designed to allow reflection on its potential implications
both for the young person and the psychologist by focusing on a particular
moment of synchrony, or “hotspot.” The purpose of employing such means
of analysis during assessments would be to enable the psychologist poten-
tially to reduce the risk of harm by recognizing the potential significance of
the moment. A focus on the moment of synchrony or “hotspot” might allow
the psychologist to develop alternative representations to diagnostic or deficit
narratives and perhaps support the young person’s attempts to make sense of
his or her own history of (abusive) experiences within a coherent “preferred”
narrative (White 1989) of potential transformation.
Mo
In the following fictional vignette, it is argued that psychology’s epistemolo-
gical preoccupation with the category and diagnosis will not be in Mo’s best
interests and could actually result in direct harm to him. Not only might
diagnoses fuel representations of Mo from which he would have no escape,
but they might also not take into account evidence of the complex “condi-
tions” for human experience and relationality, as articulated by William
James, to which he will have been subjected. Diagnosis, causality, and
blame can be invoked in assessment processes which, it could be argued,
are battles for narrative supremacy. In the case of Mo, what would become
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the authoritative diagnosis, defining representation or narrative at a crucial
moment in his life?
Mo and his sisters had been taken into care following a judgment made by the court
(in the form of a “Finding of Fact”) that they had suffered significant harm initially
on account of them having been constantly presented by the father to medical and
other agencies for years with what eventually transpired to be insufficient cause. As a
result of countless investigations, Mo had acquired diagnoses of attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum condition as well as learning
difficulties, all received from what would have been highly regarded and competent
professionals. As well as subjecting his son to what were later deemed unnecessary
investigations, the father had also made allegations against Mo, the most serious of
which was that he had physically abused his siblings. Again, the court, through the
“Finding of Fact” (FoF) decided on the balance of probability that Mo had com-
mitted no such acts and that the father had been lying. Following a period in care a
psychological assessment of the children was instructed by the court in order that the
various diagnoses could be re-considered and recommendations made relating to
future provision for Mo, his brother and his sister, for example, concerning where
they might live, how their family relationships might be constituted, schooling and
the nature of any therapeutic intervention.
The volume of data in such a case would be massive, amounting perhaps to
thousands of pages organized eventually into a comprehensive “bundle” of
court orders and other legal documents, including reports from all the
various agencies involved including education, health, social services (school
staff, doctors, health visitors, social and family support workers), and the
police as well as many other statements of evidence gathered over the years,
for example, from parents, relatives, or carers. Such papers might range from
the purely administrative and procedural to the authoritative or descriptive,
which in this case would be graphic in their forensic exposure of incidents in
the young person’s life. There would probably be a dispute between all the
“parties,” that is, legal representatives for the mother, the father, the children,
and the local children’s services who will have instigated the proceedings.
The judge would in such a matter have issued a FoF following weeks of
deliberation during which he or she would have considered all the above
documentation together with the evidence of those witnesses who had been
subjected to cross-examination under oath. That the decision (FoF) would
have been made by a judge and not a jury is not of concern here, but
whatever opinion the psychologist might form when reading documentation,
the assessment would have to be planned and executed initially on the basis
of the Finding—that Mo and his siblings were deemed on the balance of
probability to have suffered significant harm due to the actions of the father.
This would be a prima facie narrative in respect of which the court would
demand an extensive reappraisal of previous investigations, accounts and
diagnoses. By the time I would eventually meet the children, Mo, his brother,
and sister would have been in care for some months. In contrast to the dire
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accounts likely to be found in the initial bundle, however, this vignette has
been created to represent those matters before the court in which new
evidence can emerge to make for more positive reading.
The placement with carers had been such a success that Mo and his siblings had
changed across all areas of functioning—behavioural, educational, social—and were
by all accounts now enjoying their new lives, at home and in school. While the
children had lost the substantial economic wealth of their first home, they had been
embraced by a large new family, made new friends, been exposed to new experiences
and activities and had evidently begun to present as very different young people from
the ones described in earlier documentation.
On the basis of the findings, while in many respects the damage done both to
Mo, his brother, and his sister would be life-long, the subsequent more
hopeful narrative constructed here is representative of other positive stories
found in the child protection/safeguarding system. There are huge problems
and too many tragedies in young people’s lives, but success is less news-
worthy. Given the seriousness of the findings for Mo and his siblings, success
in this case (i.e., protection from further harm and abuse) had been achieved.
The apparent transformation in the children following a period in care,
however, demonstrated success beyond the mere avoidance of harm, for
what had been emerging were completely new social behaviours, previously
unsuspected capabilities, and a range of other potentials.
The many competing narratives in the “bundle” would include accounts of
all the earlier procedures and diagnoses, accounts of the abuse suffered by the
children, and perhaps even the distress suffered by the parents not to men-
tion accounts from other people involved which would typically span the
range of human behaviour from horrendous cruelty to acts of selflessness and
kindness beyond all expectation or hope. While the psychologist will incor-
porate evidence derived from observations, interviews, and tests obtained
during direct work with the young person, the focus in this vignette is on the
“how” of being “reflective.” This lens enables the gaze to turn to the psychol-
ogist-client encounter as a means of endorsing the claim that, without
consideration of the forms of data that arise during the clinical encounter
(i.e., invoking issues of relationality and experience), the science of any
assessment would be incomplete. In particular, I reflect on the evidence of
some of my own potential psychological and emotional responses, which in
this vignette would be experienced during the first few moments of work
with Mo.
As I waited in the assessment room I could hear Mo walking down the corridor with
his school mentor [identified beforehand by Mo as a trusted “neutral” person] who
was giving him gentle re-assurances. Appearing at the door, Mo faltered, quickly
averted his gaze, turned his body and for a split second seemed on the verge of
running away.
Just a moment in time…of… “synchrony”?…a “liminal hotspot”?…
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The mentor was alert and gave Mo further sensitive encouragement while I would
also seek to reassure him, providing a chair closest to the door and arranging the
seating so he could retain the mentor’s support throughout the session via direct
visual contact. To run from the room was still a choice he could make but hopefully
Mo might opt merely to escape my gaze and seek the comfort of eye contact with his
mentor should he find the session too difficult.
Mo was terrified.
There can be many such moments during assessments that demand parti-
cular attention. There are also many competing narratives, not least in this
narrative, where the initial diagnoses and deficit-laden accounts in the
original papers would contrast with the more recent accounts of abilities
and potentials. Given that the latest reports were suggesting that Mo was now
happy both at school and in his new home, his hesitancy when approaching
the room and his alarm at the door would prompt a flood of questions, for
example:
● Just what was Mo frightened of?
● What did he think was about to happen in the assessment session?
● What exactly did he think it would involve?
● Who did he imagine this new stranger to be?
● What did he think I might know?
● What did he think this new stranger in his life might say or do?
● Might I say things about him similar to previous professionals?
● Would I too create narratives of deficits and diagnoses?
These questions provoked articulation of other more self-oriented or reflec-
tive questions:
● Might I in the very act of this assessment risk taking Mo back in time to
occasions prior to going into care when he had been taken by his father
to meet innumerable other strangers—medical and other professionals
who had then placed him within narratives of diagnosis and
categorization?
● Might I, as Gradgrind, subjugate Mo yet again to an authoritative
account of his person which just did not make sense to him, which
would disavow his own personal knowledge and experience and under-
mine his own recent transformations?
Sensing Mo’s terror as he stood at the doorway, the duty of care to him
would hopefully have been paramount during those moments when I would
struggle to avoid replicating the conditions in which for years he will have
suffered psychological and emotional harm, that is, when presented for an
array of assessments. Once in the room, the distress manifests in his
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subsequent ocular pleadings to his mentor and would compound the sense of
his psychological disarray. These would be experiential data of an evidence-
based practice, which could not be ignored and which would need to be
placed at the heart of any reflection and scientific formulation.
The data acquired both experientially and relationally in this situation
would allow the psychologist to focus on the harm and distress suffered by
Mo. They would stimulate vivid reflections of the ways in which he had for
years been subject to a series of parental actions that he would have found
bewildering and would have caused him to live in fear and confusion for
virtually the whole of his conscious existence. To compound his situation and
through no fault of his own, Mo would have been force-fed narratives of
himself variously as aggressive, abusive, and autistic, initially by his parents
but subsequently by professionals whose written opinion, in accordance with
dominant models of training and practice, would invariably adopt the diag-
nostic attitude.
As Mo panicked at the doorway, did he imagine me to be the next
professional who would intervene clumsily to confirm yet again the pro-
blems, the psychopathology, of his personhood, leaving him to contemplate
and express himself only within the narrative confines of a deficit-laden
category, that is, via “classificatory looping” (Hacking 1995)? That would
have constituted an act of great harm since it had been Mo’s sense of fear that
had increasingly been assuaged by the warmth and commitment of carers,
school staff, and social workers who, working closely together, had been
transforming his life.
For by the time of a subsequent report a few months later and almost a year since
being taken into care, virtually all Mo’s “difficulties” in learning and behaviour as
well as the “symptoms” of his ADHD and autism had, to all intents and purposes
disappeared, his life and the life of his siblings transformed by the care and protec-
tion, commitment and opportunities provided on a day to day basis over a sustained
period of time both in school and at his new home. Mo, his brother and sister were
beginning to know the feeling of being safe, physically, psychologically and
emotionally.
It would only be a sensitivity to the phenomena of experience and relation-
ality that would permit the psychologist to reflect upon a more ethical but
also more scientific framework for representing a living person, which in this
case would seek in simple practical terms to:
● minimize Mo’s distress;
● encourage Mo, school staff, and his new family to continue with their
own “preferred” transformational narratives of capability and hope; and
● develop forms of psychological representation in support of those
narratives.
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Coda
In responding to the dearth of research into the conduct of psychological
assessments within family courts, this primarily theoretical article has
addressed an area of public concern in relation to the governance of
(young) persons. Specifically, it has sought to support the work of psy-
chologists who operationalize the recommendation to become “reflective,”
suggesting that becoming “reflexive” will facilitate more responsive ontol-
ogies for direct work with young persons and thus inform the develop-
ment of research, training, and professional practices. It should be noted
that, given the focus on psychological practice, it is not being suggested
that young people’s difficulties (in this vignette, ADHD, autism, beha-
viour, and learning difficulties) can usually be ameliorated in the way
described, but the case is argued for general principles that psychologists
working with young people, in this case in family courts, need primarily
to be able to:
● investigate the science of the relational (Gergen 2009), including the
inherent reciprocity of the “clinical encounter” between psychologist
and client (Katz & Alegria 2009);
● move from the posture of a fixed to a process-oriented model of
psychological science (Vygotsky 1978; Motzkau 2011), which is better
able to engage with the experiential (dynamic) phenomena of actual
persons (Luria 1972; Sacks 2015); and
● adopt a more systematic and theoretically sensitive approach to issues of
language, interpretation, and representation in professional practice
(Bruner 1990; White & Epston 1990; Prilleltensky & Nelson 2002).
That the psychologist is invisible in assessments is an a-scientific sleight-of-
hand, and the balance to be achieved in formulation through reflective and
reflexive practices can better contemplate those complex issues of relation-
ality, experience, and representation arising within assessment encounters.
Consideration of this balance is especially necessary to achieve representa-
tions in both research and practice, which are able to tolerate something of
the person (here, Mo’s distress) and which might support the work of all
those who in England, Wales, and beyond are at the heart of child protection
legislation and the work of family courts.
The fictional vignette provided the means for analysis of the processes
whereby the psychologist might avoid reifying harm by reflections and
reflexivity in respect of particular phenomena or (synchronic) moments in
time. While in this fictional vignette Mo could not construct his own “pre-
ferred narrative,” the narratives of any final psychological report could seek
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to emphasize the care now being provided in his new home and school, for
example, and the change and transformation being achieved.
In responding to Harre’s call for “qualitative psychology as science,” an
equilibrium in psychological science can be elusive and it is proposed that
research, training, and assessment practices need to be vigilant in their
performance to recognize:
● any absence of specific persons (Billig 2011);
● the intrinsic relationality of human being (Gergen 2009);
● a potential silence in respect of human experience (Damasio 2012); and
● the constructionist nature of language and representation (Bruner 1991).
Assessments constitute an intervention, and I would argue that any lack of
rigour in the application of the above principles could render the individual
young people with whom psychologists work in family courts at risk of harm,
that is, through incomplete representations of qualities and possibilities.
While psychological science can reasonably attempt to pinpoint the aetiology
of a psychopathology in the present, it should not be allowed unscientifically
to constrain the trajectory of a possible future.
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